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VoteHere has been referenced in my talk (PDF 250k, page 2) at INDIN03 to give a real world example of computer security related risks. The example did fit too good - I've been ask from the audience whether it was true. Yes, this is a real company. And this company had exactly the problem which fiXml prevents. The slide reads:

Anything to add?

A former employee of electronic voting booth maker

VoteHere has filed a civil suit against the firm,

claiming that the company's digital balloting systems

contain error-laden software which has never been

properly audited. 2600 news 27 Feb 2003

It makes me feel sorry to have to publish a real example here, especially since the one could try to view the concerned company as a competitor of us (which they are not at all)^[1]. It seems common sense to stop short of naming the actual example. Nevertheless I feel that I have to deviate from that "rule" for a reason. We are faced here with a fundamental problem, which attacks our legal system. In the name of justice we must insist that whenever (computational) processes, incure legally binding consequences -- and balloting systems clearly do -- it must be proofen to the general public that the relevant procedures produce non-repudiable, correct results^[2]. It is important for our politicians to be aware, that their legitimacy is at stake. Assumed for example election was done at the grounds of a close source (hence no certainty) or otherwise known to be corruptible systems. That elections result can't receive support from the legal system. I consider that message important enough to deserve the backing with the actual example. Better than leaving any reader clueless and confused about the thin line between legal empowerment and fraud.

Dec. 29th, 2003: MSN news on another incedent with that company. Again I feel compelled to add, that this type of incedents is impossible with fiXml. That's why we are here.

Feb. 27th, 2004: Out of many related nots I'd like to point to Eben Moglen speech transcript - there's not much to add.

Mar. 8th, 2004: Bill Thompson has nice article on BBC News politically relevant difference between free, publically audited software and closed source dependencies. We argue, that legitimacy and legal certainty - and therefore a backing through free software - are the first goals for public administration.

Sep 29th 2004: An article (german) from "Der Spiegel" still forcast yet another desaster regarding the elections in the USA.

Oct 28th 2004: Verified Voting just went online calling for real elections.

Nov 11th 2004: The election in the USA too place and the news are full of suspected fraud and error reports due to voting machines not yet ready for the prime time. We recommend the comments of Bruce Schneier.

Jan-Mar 2006: The understanding that voting systems must be open source gains more ground _ elsewhere.

Aug. 9th, 2007: Over the past several months, the state of California conducted the most comprehensive security review yet of electronic voting machines. Security experts analyzed machines from three different manufacturers, performing both a red-team attack analysis and a detailed source-code review. Serious flaws were discovered in all machines, and as a result the machines were all decertified for use in California elections.

Sep. 28th, 2007: Dutch commission deems Nedap voting machines inappropriate for a free, equal, general, secret, integer, transparent and verifiable election process.

Jörg F. Wittenberger

[1]

They do not solve any of the problems we do. There only common thing is the field for which we propose our products.

[2]

This proof requires at least public review of open source code, incorruptible rules for rights management, physical and personal independancy of the process (through byzantine aggreement).